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Abstract:
This paper sheds new light on the economic logic of voluntary associations and the relationship 
between individual contribution and collective action. The aims are twofold.
Firstly, we seek to explain how “team reasoning” (Bacharach et al. 2006) can deeply change the 
functioning of voluntary associations (which are considered to produce a public good) when some 
or  all  of  the  individual  members  group  together  to  make  collective  decisions  about  their 
involvement or contribution, rather than deciding separately. Secondly, we seek to better understand 
the effects of heterogeneity of resources on individual involvement, in terms of both the budget 
constraints  of  individual  members  and  their  capacity  to  contribute  differentiated  non-monetary 
contributions to the association, in relation to the diversity of their personal abilities and preferences 
about the characteristics of the good produced.
To this end, we use a model of voluntary association collectively producing a public good, where 
monetary contributions (compulsory fees plus voluntary donations) is combined with volunteering. 
We analyze the conditions for an association to offer profitable conditions to its members and the 
consequences that can be drawn in terms of its existence and size. We show that, at equilibrium, the 
level of voluntary contributions is ceteris paribus higher when individuals make their decisions on 
the basis of team-reasoning rather than individually. We analyze the role played by heterogeneity of 
incomes in the formation of teams within associations.
We then introduce the concept of subjective quality into the basic model. The originality of the 
model is that we assume the public good to be characterized by at least two main components: 
quantity and quality. The quantity is considered here as a purely public component, insofar as all the 
members benefit equally from it. However, the quality of the public good is assumed to be a mixed 
(public and private) component. The agents can enjoy part of it in the same way, but there may be 
certain characteristics of quality that are difficult or impossible to measure objectively. Quality is 
always  somewhat  subjective,  to  the  extent  that  perfect  correspondence  with the  preferences  of 
heterogeneous agents is unlikely to occur. In our model, the agents can contribute money and/or 
time and effort. The latter, which we call volunteering, allows them to influence the quality of the 
good (or service) provided according to their own preferences. 
Keywords: Voluntary associations, public good, contribution, voluteering, team reasonning, 
collective action
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1. Introduction
In his seminal “Logic of Collective Action”, Olson (1971) stressed the role of groups in providing 
public goods. He pointed out that, apart for small groups or those with coercive rules, “rational, 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”. Thus, a key 
issue of most public good production games is the social dilemma in which rational individuals 
choose to free-ride. Yet, the net outcome of their action is lower than it would be if they chose to 
contribute.  As  a  consequence  of  free-riding,  the  provision  of  public  goods  characterized  by 
decreasing returns may partly or completely fail. 
In the real world, however, the picture is more optimistic, since many public goods are collectively 
produced and real individuals appear to be less inclined to free-riding than pure “rational” agents 
would be. 
Voluntary associations are the archetype of groups where individuals cooperate towards a common 
goal (Rose, 1965, Laville and Sainsaulieu 1997). In the USA, voluntary associations rely heavily on 
voluntary contributions of time and money from individuals. According to Indiana University, 88% 
of American households donated to charities in 2012.  In that year, individuals donated more than 
$228 billion, while corporations and foundations gave about $18 and $45 billion respectively.1 In 
2011,  according  to  the  Federal  Agency  for  Service  and  Volunteering,  64.3  million  Americans 
(26.8%)  volunteered  about  7.9  billion  hours  in  formal  organizations.  In  monetary  value, 
volunteering in formal organizations is estimated to be worth about $171 billion.  In  this sense, 
research on the voluntary sector contributes to developing new models of institutional behavior and 
a richer conception of the individual utility function (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).
The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical framework for better understanding the internal 
economic mechanisms of the formation and functioning of voluntary associations. Why and how do 
they form? Through what mechanisms do rational individuals succeed in cooperating? 
Empirical and experimental studies have stressed social and cultural factors, altruism and “warm 
glow” or merely the preference for cooperation, as important determinants of pro-social cooperative 
behavior (Andreoni, 1995, Crumpler and Grossman, 2008, Andreoni and Payne, 2011, Guala et al., 
2013).  In  line  with  this  literature,  we  consider  in  this  paper  that  even  while  taking  decisions 
individually, individuals remain social beings. We define the social dimension of an individual as 
the characteristics related to his or her feeling of belonging to a group. This feeling contributes to 
the individual’s decision process. We therefore consider that individuals can behave as members of 
a group, i.e.,  be  team-reasoning, acting  under a “common knowledge of solidarity” (Bacharach, 
1999; Bacharach et al. 2006; Guala et al., 2013). 
In this paper, we develop a model of voluntary association formed by individuals for the provision 
of  a  common good. At a  first  step,  we consider a set  of agents who benefit  uniformly from a 
quantity of a good. We show the existence of different symmetric and non-symmetric equilibria 
corresponding  to  the  different  modes  of  emergence  of  associations  identified  in  the  literature 
(Gordon and Babchuk, 1959; Rose, 1965; Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997). 
At the global N-symmetric equilibrium corresponding to the case of a “for-self” association, all the 
agents are equal in that they all make a fixed voluntary contribution. Voluntary contributions are 
crowded out by compulsory payments and by exogenous resources.  At the partial  K-symmetric 
equilibrium, where one  can distinguish between two categories  of  agents,  the “strong” and the 
“weak”,  only  K agents  make  voluntary  contributions.  This  case  corresponds  to  an  association 
created “for others”. Here, the effects of crowding out are also present and the level of voluntary 
1
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contributions falls with the size of the organization. At both the N-symmetric and the K-symmetric 
equilibria, the amount of voluntary contributions grows with the attractiveness of the public good. 
For all these types of equilibria, we show that the outcome of the collective action is more efficient 
when some or all individuals are “We-frame reasoning”. We-frame reasoning corresponds to the 
decision-making process  where  the  question “What  should I  do?”  proceeds  from the  upstream 
question “What should we do?”
Then, by introducing a budget constraint, we show the existence of a unique partial K-symmetric 
equilibrium, in which the K richest agents give an equal amount, while the others give the rest of 
their disposable income after dues. When it is assumed that the net income of the agent enters the 
utility function in a concave way, we find that there exists a non-symmetric equilibrium at which all 
the agents fix their voluntary contributions such that their net disposable incomes are equal. In the 
same configuration  and  after  re-introducing the  budget  constraint,  we show the  existence  of  a 
unique equilibrium at which only the richest members form a team within the association to make 
additional voluntary contributions. The members of this group give an amount that makes their net 
incomes equal.
Finally, we introduce the possibility for agents to contribute both money and time, i.e., to volunteer. 
Volunteering allows them to influence the quality of the good provided according to their  own 
preferences. In a way, quality is always somewhat subjective, insofar as perfect correspondence 
with the preferences of heterogeneous agents is unlikely to occur. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief background to our study. In 
section 3,  we present  the foundations  of  a model  of  voluntary association which is  considered 
collectively to produce a public good. The aim of the model is to better understand the functioning 
of  voluntary  organizations,  in  particular  some  recurrent  issues  faced  by  nonprofit  managers: 
membership and volunteer recruitment and retention and the decline in volunteering (Hoye et al., 
2006,  Costa et  al.,  2006).  Section 4 goes  a step further  by analyzing the different  concepts  of 
equilibrium in voluntary contributions  according to whether  individuals  base their  decisions on 
individual or team reasoning. 
We then analyze the role of the heterogeneity of the members in terms of their budget constraints in 
section 5 and of  their  capabilities for  non-monetary contributions in  section 6.  The concept  of 
subjective quality is introduced into the basic model. 
2. Voluntary contributions to the public good: the I for the We
The voluntary sector is considered as an extra-governmental provider of collective consumption 
goods, representing an alternative for unsatisfied demand (Weisbrod, 1977, 1986, 2000.) It can be 
distinguished  from  the  public  and  the  private  sectors  by  its  methods  of  providing  goods  and 
services. The public provision of goods or services is financed by compulsory taxes, while on the 
market, individuals have to pay for their consumption. With voluntary provision, on the other hand, 
individuals can choose to contribute to the provision of a good or service, whether they consume it 
or not (Olson, 1971, Sugden, 1984), by forming voluntary associations.
Under purely economic reasoning, voluntary associations were initially considered as segregated 
groups that  arise for the mutual  benefit  of  their members,  allowing them to share collectively-
provided goods which could not be provided individually or which are better provided collectively. 
In this economic perspective, associations are considered as closed “clubs”, where the “local public 
good” is provided exclusively to its members and the quantity is the same for everyone (Buchanan, 
1965, McGuire, 1974). On the other hand, in the sociological perspective, voluntary associations 
were considered as serving not only the membership, but also the “public-in-contact” or “public-at-
large”  (Ross,  1972,  Olson,  1971).   During  the  last  two  decades,  the  border  between  these 
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approaches has become blurred, with the growing development of empirical studies on voluntary 
contributions and volunteering and with the introduction of notions of impure altruism and warm 
glow for giving (Andreoni, 1988, Andreoni, 1989). In this perspective, in contrast to the theory of 
club goods, individual contributions are not perfect substitutes, meaning that individuals can be 
concerned  about  their  private  provision  as  well  as  about  the  total  amount  of  public  goods 
(Bergstrom et al., 1986). This implies that public funding for instance does not completely crowd 
out individual contributions.
According to  standard public  good theory,  the amount  of  the good provided through voluntary 
contributions will be sub-optimal because of free-riding. In theory, when agents are considered as 
pure  altruists  (Andreoni,  1988),  i.e.  when they are  interested  only in  the  total  outcome of  the 
collective action,  public  support  leads to the complete crowding-out of voluntary contributions. 
However, empirical studies show that voluntary contributions are not completely crowded-out by 
public financial support. Moreover, in experimental studies, complete free-riding is not observed. 
Experimental  studies  allow  distinguishing  between  different  determinants  of  voluntary 
contributions. These studies show that communication and common knowledge of group affiliation 
tend to increase voluntary contributions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Ellingsen et al, 2012; Guala et 
al., 2013). Other social determinants, such as certain individual characteristics (Glaeser et al., 2000), 
cooperative  values  versus  individualistic  values  (Offermann  et  al.,  1996),  socio-economic 
environment (Carpenter et al., 2004, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) also influence the provision of public 
goods. In other words, the social dimension matters. 
Empirical studies of the voluntary sector focus largely on the factors influencing donors' behavior. 
These factors include state support of the provision of public goods, the total provision of public 
goods, the fund-raising expenditure of nonprofits and individual motivations (Andreoni and Payne, 
2003; Andreoni and Payne 2012). As many empirical studies show, governmental support of the 
provision of public goods by the voluntary sector does not crowd-out individual contributions. In 
some cases, one can even observe some crowding-in. Thus, Okten and Weisbrod (2000) find no 
significant parameters of crowding-out in the United States, and even some crowding-in effects. In 
a study of international relief and development organizations, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) show that 
contributions  to  these  organizations  are  only  weakly  affected  by  public  support,  but  they  are 
positively influenced by fund-raising expenditure. In experimental studies, the crowding-out is still 
incomplete, although larger, probably due to the deliberate elimination of the social dimension in 
experiments (Andreoni 1993).
3. A basic model: the I for the We, the We for the I
The model presented in this section is an extension of a standard public good model. We consider a 
set of N agents i = 1…N with N >1, who are members of an association. In what follows, N denotes 
the size of the association. The number of members must be higher than one, by definition of an 
association. Each agent is endowed with an income wi, which can be used for private consumption 
and for the provision of a public good G. All the members have to pay a compulsory amount c, on 
top  of  which  each  member  can  add  a voluntary pecuniary contribution  di in  order  to  increase 
production of the public good. At this stage, all the members benefit equally from the public good 
provided, but at a level that depends more or less on the size of the association (rivalry). Thus the 
utility function of each agent can be written as follows: 
,)(=
1=
α
γ
θ XdNc
N
dcwU j
N
j
iiiG +++−− ∑ (1)
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The variable X has a double economic meaning. A positive value is interpreted as a fixed amount of 
monetary resources  coming from exogenous origins  (public  grants,  for  instance.)  A negative  X 
describes the net amount of fixed costs (fixed costs less exogenous resources). 
The parameters α and θ describe the production technology of the public good contributing to the 
individual utility, in the non-linear and linear forms respectively. The parameter α can be interpreted 
in terms of more or less important decreasing returns. The parameter θ is always positive, because 
contributing to  the good is  assumed to generate a  positive externality.  The introduction of  this 
parameter  allows  to  vary  the  attractiveness  of  the  good.  In  fact,  as  has  been  noted  in  some 
experimental  studies,  the  attractiveness  of  a  public  good  can  positively  influence  individual 
voluntary contributions to it (Hichri and Kirman, 2007). 
The parameter  γ denotes the publicness of the provided good by measuring its degree of rivalry 
(Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Blecha, 1987). A γ tending towards zero corresponds to decreasing 
rivalry of the public good. At one extreme,  γ  equal to zero describes the case of a collective-
consumption good in the sense of Samuelson (1954). This good is completely non-rival  and its 
consumption by one agent does not prevent others from consuming it.  Think for instance of an 
environmental association campaigning against pollution, or an association combating a disease. In 
these cases, each member benefits from the totality of the results of the collective action. On the 
contrary, a  γ equal to 1 describes a completely rival good, equivalent to a collectively provided 
private  good equally shared among the members.  As an illustration,  this  type  of  function may 
correspond to the running of housing cooperatives, fairly wide-spread nonprofit organizations in 
countries like Canada or Switzerland.
The Question of Overcrowding: Too Many I’s?
The existence of an association is conditioned by the returns individuals might expect in terms of 
improvement of their  utility function UiG when contributing to the production of a public good 
jointly with the other members. These are expected to be increasing at least until a certain size of 
the association. 
Definition  1:  By  overcrowding  we  mean  the  situation  where  the  individual  benefit,  for  each  
member, from the public good provided diminishes as the number of members grows. 
In  our  model,  overcrowding  may occur  under  certain  conditions  related  to  the  size  N  of  the 
association and to the parameters α and γ characterizing the production and the sharing rule of the 
public good. 
The case of  γ equal to zero implies the absence of overcrowding, insofar as it describes a pure 
public good (Samuelson, 1954). To understand overcrowding effects when γ is strictly positive, we 
study the variations of the production function (2) with the number of members N. 
,)(1=)(
1=
α
γ XdNcN
Nf j
N
j
++∑ (2)
  
Proposition 1: In the absence of fixed costs (namely when X ≥ 0) there is no overcrowding. More  
precisely:  
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    - if  γ ≥ α, returns to contribution decrease with the size of the association as the sharing rule  
cancels out the marginal gain expected from any individual contribution. No association of any size 
can be formed. 
    -  if  γ  <  α,  there exists  a threshold N1 beyond which any additional contribution increases  
individual utility. Thus, there is no overcrowding but there exists a minimal size which is necessary  
for association to occur. 
An interesting point resulting from this proposition is that, in line with many empirical findings, 
exogenous resources X (such as government support) do not crowd out individual contributions, as 
the threshold N1  above which association may form is an increasing function of X. Thus, the size of 
association increases with an increase in exogenous resources.  
Proposition 2:  In the presence of fixed costs, (namely if X < 0) there can exist an overcrowding  
when γ > α. More precisely:  
    - if   γ  ≤ α,  there exists a threshold N0 beyond which any additional individual contributing  
increases individual utility; 
    - if γ > α  an association may occur  only if the population size N ≥ N0. Beyond the threshold N1 
there is overcrowding. 
 
Proofs are presented in Appendix A. We begin by assuming symmetrical voluntary contributions. 
Then we study the sign of the derivative of the production function with respect to  N in different 
configurations (fixed costs versus exogenous resources). To summarize, the sign of the derivatives 
of the production function varies as follows:  
Table 1: The size of the association and overcrowding
N
                  
c
XN
′
−=0                                 
          c
XN
′−
− )(=1 αγ
γ
dN
df Undefined > 0
Association without 
overcrowding
0 < 0
Overcrowding
Note: Where c′ = c+d, with d the symmetrical voluntary contribution. 
At this stage, propositions 1 and 2 can be summarized as in table 2.  
Table 2: Overcrowding
 Cases 0>X 0<X
 
 
αγ < No overcrowding No overcrowding
αγ > Association  may 
not occur
Overcrowding
  
We then extend the scope of the results by considering the internal dynamics of the association. 
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Olson (1971) has already stressed the role of the internal structure of associations, and in particular 
its  impact  on  the  group's  capacity  to  organize  the  provision  of  public  goods.  These  internal 
structures can bring some formal or informal coordination to the process of providing the public 
good or organizing a collective action. A formal or informal team can be formed by individuals who 
decide to provide the public good even if they have to support the total cost, or at least a higher cost 
than the others. According to Olson, such teams can happen in relatively large groups. In this case, 
the public good may be provided even in non-structured groups, as some participants may be able to 
provide the public good to the entire group through a leadership commitment. More recently, Ray 
and Vohra (2001) for instance study cooperation in the provision of public goods by allowing agents 
to write binding agreements to form coalitions. 
To take into account this type of internal dynamics, in a first extension, we demonstrate that the 
results obtained above hold when  K first members, founders for instance that can be also called 
“committed  agents”,  each  make  a  fixed  voluntary  contribution  while  newcomers  (i  >  K),  or 
“involved agents”, only contribute the compulsory amount c.
Then we allow the possibility for i > K members to make a positive voluntary contribution, while 
letting the latter vary among the K first members. We show that the general case results obtained 
above hold with these new extensions.
For the rest of the paper we now consider X ≥ 0 and γ < α. 
4.  Symmetric Equilibria: from I-frame to We-frame
Voluntary associations, as defined by Rose (1965), develop “when a small group of people, finding 
they have a certain interest (or purpose) in common, agree to meet and act together in order to try to 
satisfy that  interest  or  achieve  this  purpose”  (p.  390).   In  fact,  as  noted  by Ross  (1972),  this 
definition is more appropriate to the originators or leaders in some associations rather than the 
whole membership, or for certain expressive associations (clubs, sports associations). This implies 
that team reasoning may or may not take place in such organizations, or may occur at the partial 
level of a subgroup of members, while the others continue to make their decisions in isolation. If 
some of the members of an association may feel collectively committed, others may act rather as 
individually-involved agents, or even as pure consumers.
In this section, we consider the different equilibria corresponding to different social modalities of 
formation  of  associations  that  resemble  the  definition  above.  We confine  our  attention  to  two 
particular modes of emergence of association where agents choose to act not as individuals, but as 
members of a group, acting under a “common knowledge of solidarity” (Bacharach, 1999). 
 In the first mode, the members can decide together to contribute an equal amount. In the second, 
some  members  can  form  a  team  of  contributors.  The  latter  can  be  likened  to  the  leaders  or 
originators of the association. Thus, using Bacharach’s terms, we consider a “we-frame” reasoning, 
which,  in contrast  to the “I-frame” reasoning, asks “What should we do?” instead of the more 
standard “What should I do?” (Bacharach et al., 2006). Depending on the position of the originators 
or leaders with regard to the action undertaken, one can distinguish between associations "for self" 
and  associations  "for  others".  In  the  first  case,  the  members  self-organize  with  no  distinction 
between a dominant category of active members and beneficiaries. In the organization "for others", 
on  the  contrary,  there  is  a  differentiation  a priori between  categories  of  so-called  "weak"  and 
"strong" agents (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997, p. 288.) 
These modes of emergence affect the internal functioning of the organization. In associations whose 
members are not the direct  beneficiaries,  it  is  common to observe some detachment of "weak" 
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categories  from  the  "strong"  actors.  In  this  kind  of  organization,  the  mobilization  of  passive 
beneficiaries  becomes an important  issue for  management.  In  self  oriented associations,  on the 
contrary, the difficulty consists in reaching a consensus between the "strong actors" and pursuing 
the joint action in a sustained manner (Laville and Sainsaulieu, 1997, p. 290). 
In  the  model  proposed  here,  these  situations  are  considered  using  of  different  concepts  of 
equilibrium. The N-symmetric equilibrium can be considered as the most socially desired result, in 
that it implies equal contributions from each member. It corresponds to the case of an association 
where all the participants belong to the same category of actors. 
However, following Olson (1971), when an internal group of members forms to make an additional 
voluntary contribution, for instance “strong” participants in the case of an association "for others", a 
K-symmetric equilibrium can be achieved. Finally,  introducing a budget constraint  allows us to 
analyze a partial K-symmetric equilibrium. In this case, the members belonging to the group of 
volunteers can each make an equal voluntary contribution, while members whose incomes do not 
allow them to contribute at the same level contribute less. 
4.1. N-symmetric equilibria: when all are “I” vs “We”
In the case of N-symmetric equilibrium, the voluntary contribution
 
 
Niddi ∈∀=  is equivalent to 
a voluntary increase in dues, raising them from c to dcc +′ = . Here we make an explicit distinction 
between a N-symmetric equilibrium based on individual isolated decisions (“I-frame” reasoning) 
and a N-symmetric equilibrium that can result from “We-frame” reasoning. We call these the I-N 
and We-N symmetric equilibrium respectively.
Definition 3: We define a We-N symmetric equilibrium as an equilibrium in which the N members  
of  an  association  make  a  collective  decision  about  the  level  of  their  individual  voluntary 
contributions. 
Definition 4: We define a I-N symmetric equilibrium as an equilibrium in which the N members of  
an  association  make  the  decision  about  the  level  of  their  individual  voluntary  contributions  
individually.
Following  Bacharach,  a  team  reasoner  i proceeds  in  two  steps  that  can  be  expressed  as  two 
questions: “what should we do” (as a team) and consequently “what should I do” (as a member of 
the team).  “Step one is to reason at the group level - to engage in profile-based reasoning - and (…) 
step two is to reason as an individual that because the ith component of the output of stage one is 
what it is, that's what she should do” (Bacharach et al., 2006, p. 123).
How do members calculate the level of their contributions?
The first order conditions are expressed differently depending on whether agents reason in an I-
frame or a We-frame. In the case of the I-frame, the utility function is derived with respect to the 
individual contribution di, and in the We-frame, all individual contributions dj are equal within the 
team and the utility function is thus derived with respect to this common value d of individual 
voluntary contributions.
The I-frame corresponds to standard reasoning. Individual utility is expressed by:
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and its derivative: 
∂U i
∂d i
=1+ θα
N γ(Nc+∑
j≠i
d j+d i+X )
1α (3)
In the We-frame, because members are in symmetrical positions, the answer to the question “What 
should we do?” is: to reach a total contribution D* shared equally among the team and which 
maximizes the individual utility of each member. Then the answer to the question “What should I 
do?” will be: to contribute at a level d*=D*/N.
This time, the individual utility function can be written:
,))((= αγ
θ XdcN
N
dcwU i +++−−
and its derivative: 
.))((1= 1
1
α
γθα
−
−
++
+−
∂
∂
XdcN
N
d
U i
 (4)
The two expressions (3) and (4) of the derivative of individual utility differ in the power of the size 
of the association N.
Proposition 3: Without budget constraint, there exists a unique I-N symmetric equilibrium of the  
voluntary contribution *d  whose value is increasing in θ and α and decreasing in c and X.  
For X=0 (and more widely X≤0), *d  is decreasing with N.
For X>0, there exists a value N* under which d* is decreasing with N and above which d* is  
increasing with N. N* is an increasing function of θ and a decreasing function of X.
Proof is given in Appendix B.
Example: the sign of *d : *d  is constrained to a positive or zero value. Due to the concavity of the 
utility function (X≥0 and α ∈] 0,1[ ), a negative value of d resulting from the first order conditions 
will give d*=0 because the utility function is thus decreasing for any d ≥ 0.  
At the limit, d=0 ⇔  0)( 1
1
1
1
1
=−+ −−
+
− αα
γ
α
γ
θαXNcN (5)
To illustrate this, let us take the case where αγ −1= , then equation (5) becomes 
0=)( 1
1
2 αθα −−+ XNCN   (6)  that has a negative and a positive root .
−
N
Thus, d is negative for any size −< NN  and positive for 
−
> NN . 
Then, d*=0   −≤∀ NN  and 0* >d  
−
>∀ NN .
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,)(= αγ
θ XddNc
N
dcwU
ij
ijiii ++++−− ∑
≠
Thus, −N is a threshold above which there exists a N-symmetric equilibrium with positive voluntary 
contributions.  
Proposition  4: In  the  absence  of  budget  constraint,  there  exists  a  unique  We-N  symmetric  
equilibrium of voluntary contributions dN whose value is increasing in N, θ and α and decreasing in  
c and X.
Proof is given in Appendix B.
Illustration: Sign of Nd . Let us consider the case where α =2/3 and γ =1/3 (thus γ =1-α ).
d=0 ⇔ 0=)
3
2( 23 XCNN −−
 (7)
Equation (7) admits a negative and a positive root 
=
N
. Thus d is negative when N>
=
N
.
Then, 
=
N represents the threshold above which a “We-N” team tends to generate a positive 
voluntary contribution.  
Proposition 5: We-N versus I-N equilibrium
For any size of the association, a We-N symmetric equilibrium gives rise to higher voluntary 
contributions than an I-N one.  
Proof is given in Appendix B.
The considerations above concern the choice of the size of the association. Members may have 
incentives to recruit new members rather than reducing their dues, which might also mean reducing 
the scope of the collective action. This may be the case for the organizations Olson wrote about, 
which almost always welcome newcomers (Olson, 1971, p. 59.) Depending on the level of dues and 
on the structure of distribution of agents’ income, it may be more or less difficult to attract new 
members. Furthermore, when there are criteria for joining an association, this may limit its 
accessibility to potential members. Gordon and Babchuk (1959), who studied these membership 
criteria, identified the criteria of merit (as in the American Sociological Society, for instance) and 
the criteria of attributes, such as gender (e.g. feminist associations), origins or culture (for instance 
an association of Ukrainians), or simply certain social links between members. 
Some associations may, on the contrary, prefer to restrict entry, like the so-called “status 
organizations” (Hansmann, 1986), which grant their participants a certain social status (Gordon and 
Babchuk, 1959.) In these organizations, the decision of an individual to join depends not only on 
the characteristics and the price of the collective good provided, but also on the characteristics of 
the members. This kind of association establishes a minimal status level (in social, economic or 
other terms) in addition to membership dues. When membership in an organization provides its 
members with social status, members may decide to limit the number of newcomers. This is the 
case described by Olson (1971): 
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“If the top “400” were to become the top “4000”, the benefits to the entrants would be offset by the 
losses of old members, who would have traded an exalted social connection for one that might be 
only respectable" (Olson, 1971, p. 37.) 
 In any case, there exists a trade-off between the size of the organization and the level of dues. 
4.2. K-Symmetric Equilibrium: Who are “We”?
We shall now consider a so-called “We-frame” context, where the coordinated initiative of a group 
of K members decides collectively to make a symmetric voluntary contribution. Generally, such 
coordination is difficult to achieve and the organization costs can be high. However, in some cases 
an existing group which has already met the organization costs may facilitate further collective 
action (Olson, 1971, Ross, 1972, Coleman, 1988). As pointed out in the literature (Auman and 
Dreze, 1974), the aptitude of a group to provide a collective good can be partly explained by its 
origins and the factors that sustain it. The idea that pre-existing organizations can facilitate the 
collective action has been suggested by Coleman (1988) in the form of the concept of social capital.
Groups of individuals who desire to contribute more can have various different origins. Besides a 
pre-existing organization, they may be founded on kinship links or shared social and cultural 
characteristics or representations.
Definition 4: We define a We-K symmetric equilibrium as an equilibrium in which K < N members 
of an association make a collective decision about the level of their individual voluntary 
contributions while the other members decide their individual contribution individually.
Proposition 6: For any NK ≤ , there exists a unique We-K symmetric equilibrium such that 
Kidd Ki ∈∀= , and dj = 0 ∀  j∈(N-K).  Moreover, Kd  is increasing in K , θ , and α  and 
decreasing in N , X , and c . 
The proof is given in Appendix B.
  
Example Sign of Kd : 
0=Kd ⇔ 0.=)(
1
1
1
XNc
N
K
−−
−
−
α
γ
αθα
 (8)
In the case of αγ −1= , (8) can be written:
0.=)( 1
1
2 αθα −−+ KXNCN (9)
Equation (9) has a negative and a positive root denoted ÑK
0<Kd  if N < ÑK
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0>Kd  if N> ÑK .
Thus, ÑK is the threshold above which a K-team brings a positive voluntary contribution. 
The propositions 3, 4 and 6 postulate, respectively, that at N-symmetric and K-symmetric equilibria, 
the  voluntary  contribution  decreases  with  an  increase  in  the  external  resources  X.  This  result 
illustrates  the  effect  of  crowding  out  currently  highlighted  by  the  models  of  “pure  altruism” 
(Andreoni, 1988), where individuals are interested in total provision of the public good. As has been 
shown in a  number of  theoretical  studies,  under  the “purely altruistic  preferences” assumption, 
voluntary contributions are completely crowded out by public subsidies (Andreoni, 1988, 1990, 
Ribar  and  Wilhelm,  2002).  However,  this  assumption  has  been  challenged  by  empirical  facts, 
notably in the nonprofit area (Steinberg, 1987, Andreoni, 1988, 1990, Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). 
The  assumption  of  “impurely  altruistic  preferences”  (Andreoni,  1988),  according  to  which 
individuals derive utility not only from total provision of the public good, but also from the act of 
giving,  accounts  better  for  the  persistence  of  voluntary contributions  in  the  presence  of  public 
financial support. Under this assumption, the crowding-out of voluntary contributions is incomplete 
(see for instance Steinberg, 1987.) Moreover, Rose-Ackerman (1986) shows the possible crowding-
in effect of government grants in situations where voluntary contributions and grants are not perfect 
substitutes. However, in her model, crowding-in effects are only possible under the condition that 
the government is able to impose its rules on the organizations it supports concerning the services 
they provide. 
The result that voluntary contributions are increasing in  θ  describes the positive effects of the 
attractiveness of the public good on individual incentives to contribute. This theoretical finding is 
supported by a number of experimental studies, where an increase in the parameter of attractiveness 
leads to an increase in the mean of voluntary contributions, but not necessarily at the individual 
level of each subject (Hichri and Kirman, 2007).
Finally,  according to  the proposition above,  K agents  forming an  internal  team may decide  to 
contribute an equal amount while others pay only the compulsory dues. The voluntary contribution 
decreasing in N  sheds light on the character of the sharing between the members of the team and 
the rest of the group. Given the size K of the team of volunteers, the amount of their effort dK being 
decreasing with  N, means that the incentive to contribute is smaller as the team of volunteers is 
small compared to the size of the association. Conversely, given N, dK is increasing with the size K 
of the team of volunteers, thus when the team may gather a growing share of the population.
Individuals may be averse to sharing a common good among a large number of people when a 
public good is congestible (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). As Ahn 
et al. (2009) showed, individuals contribute greater amounts for the provision of collective goods in 
restricted-entry groups than in free-entry groups. In these restricted-entry groups, the selection of 
newcomers by members leads to an increase in contributions and earnings. 
In the real world, homophile preferences and the size and composition of the population lead to the 
formation of homogeneous groups (Cohen, 1977; Popielarz and McPehrson, 1995).  Social structure 
can constrain or favor individual choices based on homophile preferences (McPherson and Lovin 
1987).   Therefore,  among the factors  influencing the internal  teams  in  associations,  we should 
distinguish between constrained and freely-chosen homophily. 
We shall  incorporate  this  idea  into our  model  in  the  last  section of  this  paper,  by introducing 
individual preferences for the subjective quality of the public good.
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5.  Voluntary contributions and heterogeneity of incomes
Going one step further, this section aims to introduce the impact of heterogeneity of incomes on the 
formation of teams of volunteers within associations. Heterogeneity of the agents' economic power 
has to be taken into account through two complementary aspects: the budget constraints and the fact 
that marginal contribution of one monetary unit to the individual utility depends on the level of 
income. We will introduce these two aspects successively into our model.
5.1.  Budget constraint and partial K-symmetric equilibrium: 
a We-frame for the richest
Here, we introduce some heterogeneity by imposing the budget constraint that influences agents' 
choices. In the case with budget constraint, members of the association are constrained to a level of 
contributions that cannot exceed the level of id  limited by their income  iw .
This may result in a team-based equilibrium in which only contributions of a share K of the total 
population N are symmetric. 
Proposition 7: Given a distribution of incomes, there exists a unique value of NK ≤  and a unique 
We-K symmetric equilibrium, such that  0}|{== ≥−−∈∀ KkKi dcwkKidd  and cwd jj −=  
)( KNj −∈∀ .  
The proof is given in Appendix C.
5.2. Heterogeneity of incomes and non-symmetric equilibrium: 
We-frame and price discrimination
In this section, we study the relation between the level of voluntary contributions and incomes by 
introducing the non-constant character of the marginal contribution of a monetary unit to the 
individual utility. Taking the individual utility model based on division of the budget between 
private consumption and contributions to the public good, we can consider that the net income of 
the agent i, or ii dcw −−  contributes to her utility in a concave way. Consequently, we can note:
.)()(=
1=
α
γ
β θ XdNc
N
dcwU j
N
j
iii +++−− ∑ (10)
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Proposition 8: There exists a unique equilibrium under constraint, in which the richest agents of a 
sub-group NK ≤  contribute at such a level that their net incomes are reduced to a common 
reference level 0>= 0wdcw ii −−  for all the agents in K , while the agents from KN − , whose 
incomes are less than cw +0 , do not make any voluntary contributions.  
For proof see Appendix C.
Proposition 8 shows how the agents choose their level of voluntary contribution at a non-symmetric 
equilibrium. In fact, in this case, each agent pays a personalized price for the public good. The 
ability  of  voluntary  organizations  to  establish  personalized  prices  (or  a  system  of  price 
discrimination) has already been stressed in the economic literature (Hansmann, 1981, Ben-Ner, 
1986.)  According  to  Ben-Ner,  the  non-market  interactions  between  members,  (kinship  links, 
neighborhood, common background), as well as the non-profit distribution constraint, allow these 
organizations to reveal demands and to establish personalized prices. 
    The result where all the agents are reduced to the same level  0w  of net income is somewhat 
simplistic. This is due to the fact that in this model, the share of the initial allocation dedicated to 
private  consumption  corresponds  to  an  homogenous  good  with  a  unique  technology  of 
consumption. However,  in real  life,  disposable income is rather devoted partly to differentiated 
baskets of goods characterized by diversified consumption technologies and partly to savings. 
 6.  Volunteering and subjective quality: The I for the We and 
the I for the I
Now, let us assume that the agents can contribute to the public good not only money, but also their 
time and effort.  One can differentiate three main types  of theoretical  framework for explaining 
volunteering:  pure  public  good  models,  private  consumption  models  and  investment  models 
(Ziemek, 2006.) Pure public good models consider that volunteers are motivated exclusively by 
total provision of the public good. Private consumption models focus on personal rewards,  like 
social status or simply a warm glow. Investment models may be considered as a special case of 
private  consumption  model,  as  volunteering  provides  certain  benefits  associated  with  the 
accumulation of human and social capital. 
The  model  we  describe  below  is  situated  between  the  "pure  public  goods"  and  "private 
consumption" approaches, as the act of volunteering is not independent of the characteristics of the 
public good to which it contributes. We consider that volunteering provides an additional utility to 
the one derived from total  provision, as in Steinberg (1987),  for instance. Steinberg's approach, 
considered as a "mixed public-private good approach", represents a case of an "impurely altruistic 
model"  (Andreoni,  1990).  The  individual  utility  function  includes  the  public  goods  provided 
through the  agent's  individual  voluntary contribution,  public  resources  and  the contributions  of 
others. The individual contribution and the other agents' contributions are complementary when the 
individual is faced with social comparisons within her group of reference. When the individual is 
motivated only by total  provision, her  contributions  and the contributions  of  others  are perfect 
substitutes. 
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In  our  model,  each  member  i  can  contribute  to  the  public  good  by  making  a  non-monetary 
contribution  of  effort  noted  iv ,  which  is  subjective  in  value  and  which  adds  to  her  monetary 
contribution di . This effort allows agents to influence the quality of the public good according to 
their own preferences. The quality is subjective insofar as it cannot always be evaluated objectively. 
In  other  words,  the quality of  a  good (or  a  service) is  subjective when it is  evaluated through 
individual perceptions rather than standardized measures.
One notable example of the use of subjective quality comes from the field of child day-care. Here, 
the  measurement  of  quality  is  influenced  by  parents'  preferences  concerning  certain  service 
characteristics, making it more subjective than the standards elaborated by experts. For instance, it 
may be important to know whether the provider of the child-care service speaks the same language, 
shares the same values or the same religion. This implies that an individual's perception of quality 
may differ not only from others' perceptions, but also from the more objective evaluations made by 
experts using an index of quality (Farquhar, 1993, Moss, 1994.) In fact, as Evers and Riedel (2004) 
have shown in a German case study, the development of nonprofit child-care centers was mainly 
driven  by the  desire  of  some  parents  to  create  a  service  in  keeping with  certain  pedagogical, 
ideological or religious principles. As observed in the United States, nonprofit child-care centers 
tend to include parent participation and provide more labor-intensive services than private ones 
(Kushman, 1979). 
We therefore suggest that the members of an association can volunteer in the hope of influencing 
the subjective quality of the good or service being provided. Bearing in mind the example of child 
care,  the  role  of  volunteers  can  consist  in  organizing  activities  according  to  their  cultural 
background  or  educational  convictions.  In  the  field  of  the  arts,  active  members  can  influence 
programming choices according to their personal tastes. Finally, in a charity helping the poor, the 
more  active  volunteers  can  influence  the  criteria  of  eligibility  or  the  order  of  priority  (Rose-
Ackerman, 1986.)
Two aspects must be taken into consideration here:  
- The cost of the effort.
By convention,  we  measure  effort  iv  as  a  fraction  of  the  individual's  disposable  time  that  is 
dedicated to the volunteering, or [0,1]∈iv . For i, the effort iv  represents an opportunity cost that is 
proportional to her income. We assume that each agent i  works a length of time 1 to earn an income 
iw . Thus, the opportunity cost can be written as ii wv . 
- The impact on the subjective value of the good.
The subjective value of the public good for the agent i depends both on the total amount of effort 
provided by all the volunteers and on the weight of her own effort as a proportion of the total. The 
combination of both can differ according to how “individualistic” the association is. So agents can 
attach more or less value to the public good itself, but they also value their own contributions more 
or less highly. 
 Thus, the subjective level of effort can be written as follows: 
.)(1=)(1
1=
iiij
N
j
vvvv +−+−
−∑ δδδ (11)
 where δ  is the parameter of “individualism”. Two extreme cases can be considered:  
    - 0=δ  leads to j
N
j v∑ 1=  and expresses a purely collective orientation. In other words, the effort 
of a volunteer is added to the sum of efforts provided by other agents; efforts are pure substitutes. 
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    -  1=δ  leads  to  iv  and  designates  a  purely individualistic  orientation,  where  the personal 
contribution is the only one valued, in spite of the effort provided by others. 
 We consider that δ , the so-called parameter of individualism, characterizes the type of association. 
Under  some  conditions,  it  is  possible  to  link  this  parameter  with  the  typology  of  voluntary 
associations  (see  for  instance  Gordon  and  Babchuk,  1959),  defining  them  as  “expressive”  or 
“instrumental groups”. The main objective of the first type of association is to provide common 
activities  for  their  members.  The  members  are  direct  beneficiaries  of  organized  activities  (for 
instance a country-club.) A δ  equal to one denotes a purely expressive association, inasmuch as 
participation in its activities provides a direct gratification for the members. On the contrary, the 
main function of so-called instrumental associations is directed outside the organization. This kind 
of association aims to create and maintain a normative condition or a commitment (Gordon and 
Babchuk, p. 25) and exercises a social influence. Examples include associations for the defense of 
the rights of minorities and the poor, or certain political and religious organizations. The extreme 
case of such an association is denoted by a value of δ  equal to zero. In other words, it is assumed 
that the members are driven by ideological principles or common values, rather than the pleasure of 
participating in a shared activity. In real life, voluntary associations can accomplish both functions. 
For  example,  some  associations  may  have  an  expressive  function  at  the  local  level  and  an 
instrumental function at the national level. Intermediate associations may be situated between the 
two extreme cases with a δ  more or less close to 0 or to 1.
In our model, we introduce effort into the production function of the public good by means of a 
Cobb-Douglas function. The utility of the agent i is now written as: 
βα
γ δδ
θ ))((1)(=
1=1=
ij
N
j
j
N
j
iiiii vvXdNcN
vwdcwU +−+++−−− ∑∑ (12)
 with α  and β  ]0,1[∈ .
In a standard way, each agent i  determines her pecuniary contribution id  and her effort iv  so as to 
maximize  her  subjective  utility  iU ,  according  to  her  rational  expectations  about  the  levels  of 
voluntary contributions jjij dd −≠∑ =  and effort iiij vv −≠∑ =  made by the other agents.
Proposition 9:   At equilibrium, each agent fixes her levels of voluntary contribution and effort 
),( ii vd  by attributing to  the latter  a  relative  weight  depending on her  income.  The lower the  
income, the higher the relative weight of the effort. In other words, a poorer agent will compensate  
for her weak monetary contribution by a greater effort. Moreover, for all the agents, the level of  
direct effort is an increasing function of the degree of individualism δ .  
For proof see Appendix D.
The model above shows that pecuniary contributions and volunteering can well be made jointly. 
This conforms to the stylized facts, whereby monetary donations and volunteering often go together 
(Cappellari et al., 2011). One of explanations is that motivated by “warm glow”, donors need to 
control  the  use of  their  donations.  In  our  model,  we stress  the  idea  that  the  trade-off  between 
monetary contributions and volunteering can also be based on the desire to influence the quality of 
the public output. Moreover, the valuation of the public good becomes socially-based, to the extent 
that it depends on the agents' characteristics (culture, education, ideological considerations, etc.) 
Pecuniary  contributions  and  volunteering  may  well  influence  the  characteristics  of  the  good 
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differently. The greater the  δ  (the parameter of individualism characterizing the association), the 
greater the effort provided by individual. In other words, the model predicts that volunteering is 
likely to be more important  in expressive associations (Gordon and Babchuk, 1959),  i.e.,  those 
essentially oriented towards the interests of their members.
This finding is in line with empirical studies on volunteering. Salamon et al. (2003) highlight the 
important  role  of  volunteers  in  the  field  of  culture  and  arts,  accounting for  a  quarter  of  total 
volunteering. According to Schervish and Havens (1997), volunteers in the United States largely 
benefit from the activities they create.  In France, more than half of the members of expressive 
associations (social clubs, etc.) take part in the shared activities as organizers at least once a week, 
compared with 34 per cent in the instrumental  associations.  Volunteering is  often motivated by 
specific needs, for example regarding children's education (Prouteau and Wolff 2004; Carlin, 2001; 
Ziemek, 2006). 
As  regards  the  effect  of  income  on  volunteering,  according  to  (D.3),  the  level  of  effort  is  a 
decreasing function of wi. In other words, the effort of volunteering is likely to rise when the wage 
rate decreases. An empirical support to this finding was provided by Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), 
who found an inverse relation between volunteering and wage rates.  Moreover,  Andreoni et  al. 
(1996) documented a relatively substantial  negative effect  of  the net  wage on volunteer  hours. 
However, the effects of wage rate on volunteering may be sensitive to the type of  motivation or 
other determinants.
7.  Conclusion
In  this  paper,  we have  analyzed  the  voluntary association  as  a  means  of  collective action.  An 
important feature of these organizations is individual involvement in a common action. We have 
introduced different ways for individuals to participate in voluntary associations according to the 
degree of their commitment to collective aims, corresponding to a shift from personal to collective 
self (Brewer and Gardner, 1996).
We have developed a model of voluntary association formed by individuals interested in obtaining 
satisfaction from the provision of a common good. We show that the efficiency of collective action 
is higher when some or all individuals follow “We-frame” reasoning (Bacharach et al., 2006).
The main contribution of this paper consists in highlighting voluntary association as a group of 
individuals  formed  around  a  common goal.  In  this  sense,  voluntary  associations  appear  as  an 
archetypal case of team reasoning formation. But this does not exclude that possibility that the 
members of an association may have their own aspirations and conceptions of the good or service 
they want to provide. One implication of our findings is that to attract greater volunteering effort, 
associations  should  better  respond to  the  personal  interests  of  volunteers.  In  associations  “for-
others” this could be achieved through public recognition or prestige, but also through dialogue and 
communication between members. 
An important assumption made in the model is that individuals may desire not only to increase 
production of the public good, but also to influence its quality through volunteering. The originality 
of  the  model  is  that  we  assume  the  public  good  to  be  characterized  by  at  least  two  main 
components,  namely  quantity  and  quality.  The  quantity  is  considered  here  as  a  purely  public 
component, insofar as all the members benefit equally from it. The quality of the public good is 
considered as a mixed (public and private) component. The agents can enjoy part of it in the same 
way, but there may exist certain characteristics of quality that are difficult or impossible to measure 
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objectively.  In  a  way,  quality  is  always  somewhat  subjective,  to  the  extent  that  perfect 
correspondence with the preferences of heterogeneous agents is unlikely to occur. 
In our model, the agents can contribute money or time and effort. The latter, or volunteering, allows 
them to influence the quality of the good (or service) provided according to their own preferences. 
The collective dimension of the self does not efface the personal dimension. This idea is formalized 
by introducing the concept of subjective quality, whereby the perceptions of the quality of a good 
(or service) may well differ between individuals. However, this does not exclude other possible 
motives of volunteers, which are not taken into account here. Moreover, the motives of volunteers 
to devote time and effort may differ, depending on the people and the social context. The degrees of 
motivation of individuals can also be heterogeneous. This heterogeneity of motives could be an 
interesting subject for future work.
Accepting these differences, what has been called "accepted differentiation", allows the actors to 
promote collective action. As Laville and Sainsaulieu (1997) observed, associative activity is an 
exercise in social cohesion; it does not exclude the expression of differences that come together 
around a shared project. In other words, as the saying goes, "people can share the same bed without 
sharing the same dreams." 
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 APPENDICES
A.  Proofs of propositions 1 and 2
 Let us assume first symmetric voluntary contributions, in other words dd i =  for each i , 
and note dcc +′ = . Now, the equation (2) can be re-written as 
,)(1=)( αγ XcNNNf +′ (A.1)
 To make )(Nf  defined and continuous, let us assume that 
0,≥+′ XcN
 or that 
.= 0N
c
XN
′
−≥ (A.2)
 When  0<X  (namely, in the presence of fixed costs), this condition means that the number of 
participants must be high enough for the sum of individual contributions c′  to compensate the fixed 
cost X .
When 0≥X , this condition holds for any value of 0≥N . 
The derivative of the production function of the public good (A.1) can be written as follows: 
.)(
)(
=
d
d
11 αγ
γγα
−+ +′
−−′
XcNN
XcN
N
f (A.3)
 Given (A.2), the sign of the derivative will be the one of the numerator (A.3), or 
).)((=
d
d XcNsg
N
f
sg γγα −−′ (A.4)
 (i.) When X ≥ 0, namely in the presence of public subsidies,  
If γ ≥ α, 
.0,
d
d N
N
f ∀≤ (A.5)
In this case, association does not make sense as the sharing rule described by γ cancels the gain of 
individual utility. 
 
If γ < α,  
The variation of the sign of the derivative is given in the table below.
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 Thus, the previous results are found with 
c
YN −=0
 and 
.)(=1 c
YN
γα
γ
−
(A.12)
 An important issue here is to situate 1N  with regard to K . 
If 0≥Y  and αγ < , 
K
c
YN ≥
− )(=1 γα
γ
 if and only if 
.)( cKY γαγ −≥ (A.13)
 By substituting (A.11) in (A.13) we obtain 
.])([ XdcK γγα ≤−− (A.14)
  
    - If the term of the equation (A.14) 0>)( dc −− γα , i.e. if the compulsory amount is 
high enough relative to voluntary contributions, then we obtain 
.=)(< sdc
XK
−− γα
γ (A.15)
 
Therefore we obtain the following table of variations, where two alternative cases depend on 
the relative position of K with regard to s .
 
Thus, for a population that is large enough, there is no overcrowding. 
    - In the case where 0)( ≤−− dc γα  and 0≥X , the inequality (A.14) holds for any 
0≥K
 (here we are in the alternative case 1NK ≤ ). 
If 0<X , we find the two alternative cases above.
Finally, if 0<Y , we find the previous results. 
 
A.2  Extension 2
 If beyond the number K it is possible to make voluntary contributions, the situation of every 
member  is  improved.  Overcrowding  remains  absent,  but  it  can  occur  when  0<Y  and  αγ > , 
beyond a threshold possibly moved forward.
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A.3  Extension 3
 If below K, the voluntary contributions vary, one can substitute  Kd  by j
K
j dD ∑ 1== . The 
result still holds.
B.  Proofs of propositions 3 to 6
 
B.1  Proof of proposition 3
 Given the utility function 
    
,)(= αγ
θ XddNc
N
dcwU
ij
ijiii ++++−− ∑
≠
     (B.1)
 
∂U i
∂d i
=1+ θα
N γ(Nc+∑
j≠i
d j+d i+X )
1α (B.2)
The  first-order  condition  for  a  N-symmetric  equilibrium  gives  the  optimal  value  of  voluntary 
contributions without budget constraint2.
.
)(
=
1
1
1
1
* c
N
X
N
d −−−
+
−
α
α
γ
θα (B.3)
From equation (B.3) follows that *d  is decreasing in X and C and increasing in θ  and α  .
The variations of d* with N depend on the sign of the derivative  
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If X≤0  0
*
<
∂
∂
N
d
 
∀
 N then d* is a decreasing function of N.
If X>0 
0
*
=
∂
∂
N
d
  
⇔ N=
γαα
γ
θα
1
1 ])1
1
([ −−
+
X =N*
d* is a decreasing function in N for N<N*
and increasing with N for N>N* 
where N* is a growing function of θ and decreasing function of X .
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B.2. Proof of proposition 4
In a We-frame the utility function for any Ni ∈ can be written as follows
,))((= αγ
θ XdcN
N
dcwU i +++−−  and
2The second order conditions hold if 0≥X  and 1<α .
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XdcN
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d
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The F.O.C. gives .)(= 11
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−
− α
γα
αθα
 Following the assumption X≥0, Nd  is an increasing function of N and a decreasing function of X. 
■
B.3 Proof of proposition 5
Denote c*=d*+c for the I-frame equilibrium and Nc = cd N +  for the We-frame one.
N
c >c* ⇔ 1
1
1 1
+
−
−
−
>
α
γ
α
γα
N
N
 provided that 0<γ<α <1 ⇔  )(1
1
γα
γα
−−
− >
N
N
 
⇔ 1>
N
1
■
 B.4 Proof of proposition 6
The proof proceeds in two steps.
First, let us consider the K-team. Members of the team determine a level of contribution dK 
maximizing the individual utility of each of them.
Denote d the individual voluntary contribution of the team's members, then their utility function can 
be written: 
,)(= αγ
θ XKdNc
N
dcwUKi ii +++−−∈∀ (B.4)
under the rational expectation that members outside the K-team do not bring any contribution over 
and above the compulsory amount c.
 Maximizing (B.4) yields 
α
γ
θα
−
=++ 1
1
)(
N
KXKdNc K                                            (B.5)
thus
.
)(
=
1
1
K
XNc
N
K
d K
−−
−α
γ
θα
(B.6)
To show that this actually defines an equilibrium, it is then necessary to validate the above rational 
expectation.
Let us consider the individuals outside the K-team:
,)(=, αγ
θ XddKdNc
N
dcwUKNi ii
K
iii +++++−−−∈∀ −  (B.7)
where .=
,
∑
≠−∈
−
ijKNj
ji dd
FOC give ,)()(= 1
1
i
K
i dXKdNcN
d
−
−
−+−−αγ
θα
 (B.8)
where d
-i >0 iff ∃ j ∈ N-K: dj >0 and d-i = 0 conversely.
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By substituting (B.5) in (B.8) provided K > 1, α < 1, and thus 11
1
>−αK ,
,]1[)(= 1
1
1
1
ii dKN
d
−
−−
−−−
αα
γ
θα
 and then di < 0.
Thus, i does not bring any (positive) voluntary contribution, validating the expectation of the 
members of the K-team.
From (B.6) it follows that Kd  is increasing in θ , α , and K  and decreasing in N , X , and c . 
C Proofs of the propositions 7 and 8
C.1  Proof of proposition 7
 Let  us  rank  the  population  of  agents  in  decreasing  order  of  incomes  as  follows: 
wiwij j ≤⇒> .
The result is a straightforward consequence of the properties shown by Foray, Thoron, and 
Zimmermann (2007) applied to the previous model of equilibrium with constraints. The distribution 
of voluntary contributions is as follows
  
Now, the individual utility is written for any Ki ∈  as follows: 
,)(= αγ
θ XDKdNc
N
dcwU KNKKi
K
i ++++−−
− (C.1)
 where 
.=
>
cwD j
Kj
KN
−∑
−
 or 
,))((= αγ
θ XdcK
N
dcwU KNKKi
K
i +Ω+++−−
− (C.2)
 where 
.=
)(
j
KNj
KN w∑
−∈
−Ω
 For any Ki ∈ , 
.))((1= 1−− +Ω+++−
∂
∂ α
γ
θα XdcK
N
K
d
U KNK
K
i (C.3)
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 By assuming 0=K
i
d
U
∂
∂
, we obtain an optimal value of contributions for any Ki ∈ : 
.
1])[(= 1
1
c
K
X
N
Kd KNK −−Ω− −−αγ
θα (C.4)
 According to Foray, Thoron and Zimmermann (2007), the value of K  is adjusted in such a way, 
that Kk dcw ≥−  and KK dcw <1 −+ . 
C.2.  Proof of proposition 8
The proof proceeds in two steps.
In the first step, we compute the individual levels of contribution without any constraint. Then in 
the second step, we introduce budget constraints and the necessity for voluntary contributions to be 
positive or zero.
Step 1: Contributions without budget constraint
Now, the first order condition is written as 
.
)()(
=
1
1=
1
α
γβ
αθβ
−
−
++
+
−−
−
∂
∂
∑ XdNc
Ndcwd
U
j
N
j
iii
i
(C.5)
 The second order condition becomes 
0.<
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)(1
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)(1
=
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(C.6)
 The non-constrained equilibrium is obtained by assuming 0=
i
i
d
U
∂
∂
 
Ni ∈∀
 under condition 
0.>ii dcw −− (C.7)
 We obtain therefore 
.
)(
=)( 1
1=
1
α
γβ
αθβ
−
−
++
−−
∑ XdNc
Ndcw
j
N
j
ii (C.8)
 It follows consequently that ji ≠∀  
ββ
ββ
−−
−−−−
11 )(=)( jjii dcwdcw
 or that Ni ∈∀ , 0= wdcw ii −− , and thus 
.= 0 cwwd ii −− (C.9)
 Thus, after voluntary contribution, all the agents are brought to the same level of net income 0w . 
Now, we can write 
),(=)(= 00
1=1=
wcNwcNwd j
N
j
j
N
j
+−Ω+−∑∑
 from which, by substituting in (D4) we obtain 
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αγβ
αθβ
−−
−+Ω 10
1
0 )(
=
NwXNw (C.10)
 It follows that  0w  solution of the implicit equation (C.10) is strictly positive, which satisfies the 
condition (C.7).
Step 2 : Budget constraints
We now introduce budget constraints: ∀i∈N, di  ≥ 0 and di  ≤  wi  - c. In a solution under constraint, 
di  < 0 becomes di   = 0, while  di  >  wi  - c becomes  di  =  wi  - c.
Nevertheless,  di   >  wi   - c ⇔  wi   - c -  w0   >  wi   - c and thus  ⇔ w0 < 0, which contradicts the 
previous assertion.
Thus the constraint  di  ≥ 0 still remains.
Here  di  < 0 if and only if  wi  < w0 + c, and the set of agents with incomes lower than  
w0 + c do not make any voluntary contribution at all.
As in Foray, Thoron, and Zimmermann (2007), if the  N agents are ranked in decreasing order of 
incomes, there exists a NK ≤  satisfying the following conditions:
The individual utility is written Ki ∈∀  
.)()(=
1=
α
γ
β θ XdNc
N
dcwU j
K
j
iii +++−− ∑ (C.11)
 In the same way as above, Ki ∈∀
cwwd ii −− 0= .
However, this time 
),(=)(= 00
1=1=
wcKwcKwd Kj
K
j
j
K
j
+−Ω+−∑∑
 and consequently, 0w  is solution of the implicit equation 
.))((= 1010 αγβ
αθβ
−−
−+−+Ω cKNKwXNw K
(C.12)
 
D.  Proof of proposition 9
To simplify the expression of the utility function, let us note  iww = ,  idm = ,  idXNcM −++= , 
ivf = , ivF −− )(1= δ , γ
θ
N
z =
 and ii dcwx −−= . The latter represents the share of the budget of i 
available for her private consumption. 
Thus, the agent i is solving the following: 
βα )()(=),,( fFmMzwfxfmxMaxU +++− (D.1)
under a budget constraint 
0=wcmx −++ (D.2)
Using the Kuhn and Tuker theorem and noting the multiplicator corresponding to the constraint 
(D.2) as  λ , we write the marginal utilities and the respective first order conditions (the marginal 
utilities are proportional to the prices): 
26
)(==1= ip
x
U
x λλ∂
∂
 
),(==)(
)(
= 1 iip
mM
fF
z
m
U
m λλα α
β
−+
+
∂
∂
 and 
)(0.==)(
)(
= 1 iiipwfF
mM
zf
U
fλβ β
α
−
+
+
∂
∂
−
 From (i) it follows that 1=λ . 
Consequently, the first order conditions (ii) and (iii) can be written as 
)()(=)( 1 iimMfFz ′++ −αβα
and 
)()(=)( 1 iiifFwmMz ′++ −βαβ
By making a cross product of the terms of these equations, we obtain: 
)(=)( mMfFw ++ βα
 
.)(= FmM
w
f −+⇔
α
β (D.3)
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